Caracas is rebuilding its economic framework and Washington is deepening its presence on the ground. The hydrocarbons regulation completes the rules for private capital to operate and market crude; the Central Bank rolls out a daily intervention model that brings its rates together toward unification, sustained by reserves that are already giving way; and the United States raises its aid to US$386 million, mounts an airlift to Maiquetía and places Marines in the control tower. The thread none of the measures shows on its own: while Venezuela reorders the form of its economy to take in capital, the management of its critical levers —crude income, and now its main airport— leans ever more on U.S. hands. What would test it: whether the regulation's Gazette text curbs fiscal discretion, or whether the airlift and personnel at Maiquetía withdraw rather than settle in. The short agenda rules: the regulation's text in the Gazette and July 28 as the date to adapt contracts.
↳ Venezuela reworks the rules of its oil and its exchange rate to attract capital, while the United States' footprint inside the country turns physical: from the crude income under Treasury custody to the Marines in Maiquetía's control tower.
June tax collection totaled Bs 509.55 billion, about US$770 million at the month's official exchange rate. VAT contributed Bs 229.18 billion and customs Bs 134.35 billion. Together they exceeded 70% of the total; income tax came in at Bs 87.97 billion.
This is the cash box the State does control, and its composition is telling: VAT and customs weigh over 70%, meaning collection depends on consumption and imports, not income —a base sensitive to the loss of purchasing power the devaluation deepens. In bolívars the figure grows with inflation; in dollars it is an order of magnitude smaller than the oil hard currency, which does not reach the Central Bank but is administered by the U.S. Treasury. It is the difference between the State's own, available income and the income that exists but sits behind an external lock. Indicator: July collection in dollars and whether VAT's share rises against income tax.
If traceability improves and the formal base widens, real collection could rise without new taxes, giving the treasury a domestic source less dependent on oil.
If the devaluation keeps accelerating, the nominal figure in bolívars will keep inflating while its real dollar value erodes, and the tax box will lose purchasing power even as it appears larger.
Delcy Rodríguez signed the Hydrocarbons Law regulation on July 8 —83 years after the first one—, the instrument needed to apply January's reform, 20 days before the July 28 deadline.
Acting president Delcy Rodríguez signed the Regulation of the Organic Hydrocarbons Law on July 8, joined by Minister Paula Henao and Economy Vice President Calixto Ortega. The instrument develops the reform published in January (Extraordinary Gazette 6,978) and defines how contracts and economic terms are modified by type of project. Its signing comes twenty days before the July 28 deadline to adapt joint ventures and Production Participation Contracts. The full text has not yet appeared in the Official Gazette.
Presidencia (E) · Min. Hidrocarburos · RNV ↗Reglamento de la LOH firmado 8-jul · desarrolla la reforma de enero (Gaceta 6.978) · plazo de adecuación: 28-jul · 26 mixtas y 13 CPP en revisión · texto aún no publicado en GacetaFor the investor, the point is not that the sector opened —that was January— but that the execution framework is now complete just before the deadline to adapt contracts. It removes one concrete risk: the regulatory vacuum that froze operations, more than the sanctions. But the knot remains: the reform made royalty and tax adjustable by project, and the regulation is where that discretion could be curbed or consolidated. Without the Gazette text, we do not know which. A framework negotiated case by case is cheap for whoever holds leverage and costly to finance for whoever needs rules. Indicator: the text in the Gazette and whether the joint ventures adapt on homogeneous terms before July 28.
The Central Bank rolled out a new intervention model on July 1 so the intervention dollar converges with the official one toward second-half unification; the official bolívar depreciated close to 8% in July's first week.
The Central Bank of Venezuela rolled out a new exchange-intervention model on July 1: instead of holding a more rigid intervention parity, it now sets the rate daily from the weighted average of the exchange desks, aiming for the intervention dollar and the official one to converge toward exchange-rate unification in the second half. In the first week the official rate rose close to 8%, to Bs 685.94 per dollar. International reserves, meanwhile, fell 3.57% in the week, to US$13.498 billion.
Banco Central de Venezuela ↗Nuevo modelo de intervención del BCV desde el 1-jul · tasa diaria hacia la unificación del 2S · bolívar oficial de Bs 633,36 a Bs 685,94 (~+8% en la semana) · reservas -3,57% al 3-jul (US$13.498M)It is worth being precise about what changed: the official dollar was already published daily, so that is not the novelty. What is new is the intervention model —the price at which the Central Bank sells foreign currency now moves daily and closes in on the official rate—, a technical step toward unification that would cut distortions and is a condition for normalizing with the multilaterals. The flip side is the cost: the bolívar depreciates faster and the defense is financed by selling reserves, half a billion less in a week. For anyone operating in Venezuela, planning in bolívars remains unworkable —prices and funding in dollars, daily adjustment to the official rate—. Indicator: whether the convergence holds without the dollar's weekly step exceeding the current 8%.
The United States raised its earthquake aid to US$386 million and set up a weekly Miami–Maiquetía airlift with Amazon and Airlink, while Marines support the main airport's control tower since July 1.
The State Department reported on July 8 that U.S. assistance for the earthquakes exceeds US$386 million, an escalation from the US$150 million announced in late June. Washington activated a weekly airlift between Miami and Maiquetía airport, coordinated with Airlink and Amazon, to move aid at no cost to humanitarian organizations. In addition, U.S. Marines have supported Maiquetía's control tower since July 1; the head of Southern Command said his country does not control the airport, but provides technical support.
Departamento de Estado · EE.UU. ↗Ayuda de EE.UU. US$386M al 8-jul · puente aéreo semanal Miami–Maiquetía con Amazon y Airlink · marines apoyan la torre de Maiquetía desde el 1-jul · Washington niega controlar el aeropuertoFor the investor, what matters is not the aid itself but what it reveals: the United States' operational presence inside Venezuela is turning ever more physical. On top of the Treasury's custody of oil income now come an airlift with U.S. logistics and military personnel in the tower of the country's main airport. That Washington frames it as humanitarian support and denies exercising control does not change the substance: Venezuela's critical infrastructure operates, in part, with U.S. hands. It is both an anchor of stability —it lowers the risk of an abrupt turn— and a sign of conditioned sovereignty that ties the country to Washington's political cycle. Indicator: whether the airlift and the personnel at Maiquetía withdraw or become permanent.