VENEECONOMIST
Analysis Type C — Sectoral · NOVEMBER 19, 2026

Venezuela, Washington’s card: from the military pact to the table with Xi and Putin

In 48 hours, the United States signed at Miraflores the military piece it was missing and sat down in Shenzhen with China and Russia to talk about energy and order among powers. Venezuela is one of the best cards it brought.

Published November 19, 2026
◆ Essay · Geopolitics Venezuela on the great-power board

On November 18, 2026, in Manila, Donald Trump did some arithmetic out loud. His country, he said, has more energy than any other, more than Russia and Saudi Arabia combined, “and then you add Venezuela — which was our new acquisition.” That same day his Secretary of War, who had flown to Caracas without press, signed a military cooperation agreement at Miraflores. A day later Trump was in Shenzhen, sitting down with Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin.

The three scenes make more sense together. With the Caracas signing, Washington finished assembling an arrangement over Venezuela that already covered the crude and the money and now reaches the armed forces, and it finished on the eve of sitting down with the other two powers.

We do not claim the calendar was deliberate. Its effect is the same as if it were: Trump arrived at that table with Venezuela in his hand.

Crude
35%
of NABEP’s parent belongs to a Department of War office. The State Department can buy 20% of output at cost.
Money
99%
of oil revenue is what Washington says it has returned to Venezuela, from an account held in its custody.
Armed forces
Nov 18
Agreement on training, intelligence and equipment signed at Miraflores. The document has not been released.

What is signed outweighs what is said, so we start there. The fact sheet the White House published in August on the oil agreement says that a Department of War office holds 35% of the parent of NABEP, the company that received 17 fields for a hundred years, and that the U.S. government can veto any member of its board.

The State Department can buy 20% of output at cost, including for “military uses,” and has a right of first refusal on the remaining 80% in “emergency situations.” Royalty and tax payments remain under Washington’s oversight. Anyone who wants to understand the word “acquisition” will find the clauses there, and we went through them in the analysis of the NABEP agreement.

Less is known about the November 18 paper, because the document has not been released. Pete Hegseth spoke of training together, sharing intelligence and adding defense equipment. Acting President Delcy Rodríguez spoke of training, equipment and access to new technologies for the armed forces.

Nor is it known whether that document provides for U.S. soldiers on Venezuelan soil, and that is the question growing fastest.

On November 3 it was reported, with no official confirmation from either government, that the State Department is negotiating with Caracas a status of forces agreement, the instrument that gives a prolonged military presence its legal basis. The Department responded at the time with a general description: it has agreements of that kind with more than a hundred countries. One of its senior officials said in Caracas that any talk of bases is “way, way down the road.”

But there is a precedent with a name and a number. After the June earthquakes, U.S. Southern Command sent about 2,000 troops into and around Venezuela, according to its commander, Gen. Francis Donovan, and those who entered have since left. The door opened once for an emergency. Whether it opens again is written, or not, in a document the country has not read.

Then there are the words. Hegseth said in Caracas that Venezuela has gone from “our most aggressive regional threat” to “a compliant security partner,” and Trump insisted in Manila: “It was an acquisition, whether people like to say that or not.”

A phrase like that, on its own, is bluster. These are not on their own: they say in other words what the August fact sheet says in clauses. When what a government declares matches what it signed, the phrase stops being an excess and becomes one party’s description of what it obtained.

Shenzhen, a day later

With that in hand, Shenzhen reads more clearly. On November 19, Trump met with Putin, with Xi and then with both, and the three governments published a four-point declaration: reform the UN from its permanent members, increase the production and supply of refined petroleum products and keep energy flows stable, protect the immunity of their officials before the International Criminal Court, and reduce nuclear risk.

It is the text of three powers that recognize one another as the ones that set the order, and that place energy among the four matters they intend to order.

That is where Venezuela counts as one of Washington’s best cards, for three reasons.

The first is that it took the card from the other two. In November 2025, 778,000 of the 952,000 barrels a day Venezuela exported went to China, according to PDVSA figures, and the China Development Bank had lent 60 billion dollars in exchange for crude. The August fact sheet puts in writing that most of NABEP’s new fields were previously in the hands of Russian and Chinese companies or of cronies of the previous governments. By September 2026 the top destination for Venezuelan crude was already the United States.

Main destinations of Venezuelan crude · thousand barrels a day
China · November 2025 778
Out of 952,000 barrels a day exported that month.
United States · September 2026 629
India · September 2026 253

Sources: PDVSA figures (November 2025) and Reuters shipping data (September 2026).

The second is that this is energy that does not pass through Hormuz. Between 45% and 50% of the crude China imports crosses that strait. Hegseth said in Caracas that cooperation with Venezuela makes Hormuz stop mattering for the Western Hemisphere, and Trump told Xi in Shenzhen that both countries have an interest in energy flowing through it. For China, nearly half its crude is at stake.

The third is that it demonstrates a doctrine. Hegseth put it in writing before Congress in April: his country will restore “military dominance” in the hemisphere and deny its adversaries the ability “to position forces” in it. An armed force that trains, equips itself and shares intelligence with one power is no longer available to the others, and that is what was signed at Miraflores.

It should not be inflated. In barrels, today, the card weighs little: Venezuelan crude was about 4% of what China imported, China held 1.39 billion barrels in storage in March, and NABEP was producing 224,000 barrels a day in mid-October.

It is worth what it takes away and what it demonstrates, and a card like that serves as well for pressing as for conceding: the debt to China, access for its companies, the destination of the crude. In neither case does Caracas decide.

What is said and what is on record

Washington has an answer to all of the above: Venezuela gets paid. It says it has returned to the country more than 12 billion dollars, almost 99% of the revenue from the sale of its oil.

This publication has followed that account document by document, and what is said about it does not match what is on record. In June, the Secretary of State told the House of Representatives that KPMG audited every disbursement. The KPMG report his own Department published in November says that work is not an audit.

The Venezuelan Finance Ministry’s portal reports that 99% of outflows went to salaries and pensioners. The same report records that the dollars were sold to companies and individuals, and the portal does not say how many bolivars reached the payroll. The numbers are in the analysis of the KPMG report.

The rest of the arrangement is handled the same way. The text of NABEP’s concessions had to be requested by letter, in September, by a group of members of the U.S. House of Representatives. The military agreement was signed without the document being released. Defense Minister Gustavo González López said after the signing that cooperation will respect the Constitution and sovereignty; what binds is the text.

And signing for Venezuela is an interim government whose term, the one the courts allowed it, expired in July, and which still has no date for the presidential election. That government commits the country for periods that outlast it: a hundred years in the fields and, in the armed forces, whatever a document that has not been released says.

The Venezuelan Constitution places those decisions elsewhere. It is the National Assembly that approves by law the treaties the Executive enters into and that authorizes the use of foreign military missions in the country. Whether or not the November 18 document reaches that chamber will say more than any statement.

Nor is there an aggrieved power here. Beijing treated Venezuela as an asset before Washington did: it lent against crude, and its independent refineries bought the sanctioned oil at a discount. That arrangement mortgaged future output. This one assigns it, and adds a veto over a board of directors and a military agreement.

Venezuela went from one power’s debtor to another’s asset. In both arrangements, the constant is who does not decide.

Sources ▾
  • Bloomberg — remarks by Donald Trump in Manila, carried by Rigzone, Nov 18, 2026. — rigzone.com
  • Presidency of Venezuela — official note on the signing of the agreement, Radio Nacional de Venezuela, Nov 18, 2026. — rnv.gob.ve
  • U.S. Department of War — remarks by Pete Hegseth in Caracas, Associated Press dispatch, Nov 18, 2026. — durangoherald.com
  • U.S. Department of War — remarks by Pete Hegseth in Caracas, Air & Space Forces Magazine, Nov 18, 2026. — airandspaceforces.com
  • Venezuelan Ministry of Defense — statement by Gustavo González López, carried by MercoPress, Nov 19, 2026. — mercopress.com
  • The New York Times — status of forces agreement and military presence, carried by The Philadelphia Inquirer, Nov 3, 2026. — inquirer.com
  • The White House — official fact sheet on the oil agreement with NABEP, Aug 31, 2026. — whitehouse.gov
  • The White House — declaration of the heads of state of the U.S., Russia and China, Nov 19, 2026. — whitehouse.gov
  • NBC News — Shenzhen meetings, coverage of Nov 19, 2026. — nbcnews.com
  • U.S. Department of War — testimony of Pete Hegseth before the House, Apr 29, 2026. — armedservices.house.gov
  • Anadolu Agency — Venezuela’s crude and debt with China, with PDVSA figures, Jan 7, 2026. — aa.com.tr
  • Columbia University — Center on Global Energy Policy, China and the closure of Hormuz, March 2026. — energypolicy.columbia.edu
  • Reuters — Venezuela’s oil exports in September, carried by Baird Maritime, Oct 1, 2026. — bairdmaritime.com
  • Reuters — NABEP output, carried by The Korea Times, Nov 18, 2026. — koreatimes.co.kr
  • U.S. Department of State — KPMG report on the custody account, January–September 2026, Oct 29, 2026. — state.gov
  • U.S. House of Representatives — Foreign Affairs Committee, hearing with Marco Rubio, Jun 3, 2026. — foreignaffairs.house.gov
  • Venezuelan Ministry of Finance — Transparencia Soberana portal, updated Nov 12, 2026. — transparenciasoberana.gob.ve
  • U.S. House of Representatives — letter to Secretaries Rubio and Hegseth on the oil deal, Sep 30, 2026. — letter (PDF)
  • Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela — 1999 Constitution, articles 154 and 187. — oas.org
Classification
Analysis Type C — Sectoral
Riesgo · Geopolítica
November 19, 2026
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VENE · ECONOMIST Intelligence Unit · Informational analysis. Does not constitute investment, legal or tax advice. Vene Economist is not a credit rating agency; the "VE Verdict" is a proprietary editorial indicator, not a credit rating. Always verify against the primary source before making decisions.

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